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Executive Summary
Since the creation of the World Trade Organization 
[WTO] in 1995 with 128 members, an additional 21 
countries have successfully acceded to the organi­
zation. On October 13, 2004, Cambodia became 
the WTO's 148th member, almost 10 years after it 
had first applied and just over a year after its mem­
bership package was approved at the Cancun Minis­
terial Conference. Cambodia is the second in the 
category of least-developed countries [LDCs] to 
join the WTO, following Nepal's accession on April 
23, 2004.
In its Protocol of Accession, Cambodia has taken 
on commitments in two major areas, including 
market access for imported goods and services and 
implementation of trade-related rules established in 
various WTO agreements. Cambodia agreed to 
bound its tariffs for all imported goods, eliminate 
export subsidies, allow foreign involvement in 
services, and apply trade-related rules either upon 
accession or at specified dates.
Cambodia's WTO accession has raised a number of 
issues that might be of concern to existing WTO 
members as well as to other applicants. First, the 
vague definition of membership criteria in the 
WTO document has resulted in a complex and 
lengthy accession process. Second, countries 
seeking membership usually have to agree on 
higher obligations but limited rights, a phenom­
enon referred to as the WTO+ commitments and 
W TO- rights. Third, the special and differential 
treatment [SDT] provisions in various WTO docu­
ments were not executed fully in the recent acces­
sion cases. The existence of these issues has greatly 
hampered the process of integration of the LDCs 
to the world economy.
A series of concrete steps must be taken to move 
the world trading system in a more pro-develop­
ment direction. WTO legal documents should lay 
out detailed and transparent criteria for accession 
and make available specific provisions for LDCs 
compared with other applicants. Developed-country 
members should also exercise restraint in seeking 
concessions and commitments on goods and 
services from acceding LDCs and take into account 
those undertaken by existing LDC members. The
role of SDT should be emphasized, and the SDT as 
set out in WTO agreements should be applicable to 
all acceding LDCs from the date of their accession. 
Accompanying the SDT, targeted and coordinated 
technical assistance and capacity building should be 
provided to acceding LDCs to cover all stages of 
the accession process.
Taking into account the interests of the identified 
stakeholder groups, your assignment is to recom­
mend how the accession process can be streamlined 
for least-developed countries.
Background
Overall Economy before Accession
Cambodia is one of the world's least-developed 
countries [LDCs] according the classification of the 
United Nations [UN], The Cambodian economy 
was completely devastated during the Khmer Rouge 
years in the late 1970s and remained stagnant 
throughout the 1980s. Cambodia witnessed 
stronger economic growth after the formation of 
the Royal Government in 1993 and subsequent 
market-oriented reforms. Real gross domestic 
product [GDP] increased at an average annual rate 
of 7.2 percent between 1993 and 1997, peaking at 
8.4 percent in 1995. After this short period of solid 
macroeconomic performance, the economy plum­
meted in 1998 as a result of regional economic 
crisis, civil violence, and political infighting. 
Economic growth resumed afterward, and the real 
GDP growth rate was maintained at 5 -6  percent 
per year in 2001-2003. Inflation in Cambodia has 
been low in recent years (except 1998], and 
deflation occurred in 1999 and 2000.
As part of its economic reform efforts, Cambodia 
embarked on a series of trade liberalization exer­
cises, with the aim of fostering its integration into 
the world economy. Key steps were taken during 
the early phases of the establishment of the Royal 
Government and after the implementation of 
several programs sponsored by the International 
Monetary Fund [IMF], Important early reforms 
included the unification of exchange rates, tariff
reform, the abolition of many nontariff barriers, 
and the implementation of a liberal Law on Invest­
ment. Under the terms of two memoranda signed 
by the IMF and Cambodia in 2001, further tariff 
reforms were introduced. Before Cambodia's WTO 
accession, the highest tariff rates of 40, 50, 90, 
and 120 percent were abolished, and the 
unweighted average tariff rate dropped to 16.5 
percent, with the number of tariff bands reduced 
from 12 to 4 [0, 7, 15, and 35 percent) (WTO 
2003a).
Economic development was pushed further by the 
Bilateral Textile Agreement signed by Cambodia 
and the United States in 1999. The agreement gave 
Cambodia a guaranteed quota of U.S. textile 
imports and established a bonus for improving 
working conditions and enforcing Cambodian labor 
laws and international labor standards in the indus­
try. In 1999-2000, the economy grew at an aver­
age rate of 9 percent, driven largely by the expan­
sion in the garment sector.1 The industrial sector 
grew at a record high rate of 31 percent in 2000. 
Increased exports of garments resulted in a sharp 
increase in the share of exports in GDP, pushing it 
to almost 60 percent in 2002. In the same year, 
the garment industry's share of total export value 
reached 84 percent (Bargawi 2005). The garment 
industry also contributed to a significant share of 
government revenue, which consisted primarily of 
value-added taxes, trade taxes, and quota auctions. 
In 2002 this share was about 40 percent (IMF
2004). Cambodia's heavy dependence on garment 
exports was also a cause for concern, however, 
because of the intense competition in this sector, 
especially after the termination of the Agreement 
on Textile and Clothing (ATC) on January 1, 2005. 
This dependence on the garment industry also 
poses substantial risks to the country's balance of 
payment and fiscal deficits, which reached -10 and 
-5  percent of GDP in 2003, respectively.
In spite of its recent economic progress, Cambodia 
has lagged significantly behind most of its neigh­
boring countries. The economy has continued to 
suffer from political instability and policy reversals 
and setbacks. Subsistence agriculture is the major 
component of the economy, employing about 80 
percent of the work force and contributing more 
than 40 percent to the national income by the end
1 The tourism industry (service sector) also registered 
high growth rates during this period.
of the 1990s. Yet the sector has experienced little 
growth in recent years (and negative growth in 
2000 and 2002). Per capita GDP in 2002 was 
estimated to be US$300 (in 1995 dollars), with 35 
percent of the population living below the poverty 
line. The poverty rate is higher (40 percent) in 
rural areas, where the majority of the population 
resides (80 percent). The rural poor suffer from 
low income and consumption, poor nutrition, little 
or no access to public services including school and 
health services, vulnerability to external shocks, and 
exclusion from economic, social, and political 
opportunities. The relatively high prevalence of 
HIV/AIDS in Cambodia is an additional challenge 
to its poverty situation.
W TO Accession
Cambodia initiated its WTO accession process in 
December 1994. At its meeting on December 21, 
1994, the General Council of the WTO established 
a Working Party to examine the application of 
Cambodia to accede to the WTO under Article XII 
of the Marrakech Agreement. Members of the 
Working Party were Australia, Canada, China, the 
EU, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, 
New Zealand, Panama, Singapore, Chinese Taipei, 
Thailand, the United States, and Venezuela. In June 
1999 Cambodia submitted its Memorandum on 
Foreign Trade Regime (MFTR) to the Working 
Party, describing, among other things, its economy, 
economic policies, domestic and international trade 
regulations, and intellectual property policies. Based 
on the memorandum, the Working Party circulated 
a series of questions posed by the WTO members. 
Cambodia's response to these questions was sub­
mitted to the WTO Secretariat in November 2000. 
Subsequently, in May 2001, Cambodia started a 
series of bilateral negotiations with WTO mem­
bers—in particular, Australia, the EU, and the 
United States. The bilateral negotiations concluded 
in July 2003.
The final meeting of the Working Party was held 
on July 22, 2003, when the accession package, 
including a summary of all prior meetings, the Pro­
tocol of Accession, and the schedules of market 
access commitments, was finally approved. 
Cambodia submitted its acceptance of the terms 
and conditions of membership set out in the 
Protocol of Accession, which was approved by the 
Ministerial Conference in Cancun on September 11, 
2003, and signed by Cambodia subject to
ratification. The Cambodian parliament ratified the 
protocol in September 2004 following the forma­
tion of the new Royal Government of Cambodia- 
after a year-long political negotiation. Cambodia 
became a member of the WTO on October 13, 
2004, 30 days after it notified the WTO about its 
ratification. Cambodia, following Nepal [a member 
since April 23, 2004), was the second LDC to 
accede to the WTO since its transformation from 
the GATT in 1995.2
M ajor Com m itm ents
The commitments made by Cambodia cover two 
major areas: market access for imported goods and 
services and implementation of trade-related rules 
established in various WTO agreements.2 3 In its 
Protocol of Accession, Cambodia agreed to bind all 
tariff lines, which effectively set ceilings on the 
tariff rates of all imported products. As a result of 
unilateral tariff reductions undertaken in the 1990s, 
the tariff levels that Cambodia had actually applied 
in 2003 were in virtually all cases equal to or lower 
than the agreed-upon levels of tariff binding in the 
protocol. Thus, no significant reductions in tariffs 
were required upon WTO accession.
In particular, Cambodia agreed to an overall 
average bound duty rate of 20 percent, whereas 
the average rate of duty actually applied in 2003 
was 16.5 percent. For agricultural products, 
Cambodia agreed to a simple-average bound rate of 
28 percent, which was higher than the average 
applied rate of 19 percent in 2003. Peak bound 
rates for the most sensitive agricultural products 
were 50-60  percent and the lowest bound rates 
were 5 percent. For industrial products, the average 
bound rate was 18 percent, compared with the rate 
actually applied in 2003 of 16 percent. Peak bound 
rates were 50 percent, and the lowest rates, 0 
percent. In addition to setting bound tariffs, 
Cambodia also agreed that it would not introduce, 
reintroduce, or apply quantitative restrictions or 
other nontariff barriers on imports, such as 
licensing, quotas, prohibitions, bans, and other
2 Altogether there are 32 LDC members in the WTO, 30 
o f which were GATT members that automatically gained 
WTO membership when W TO replaced GATT in 1994.
3 Details on commitments on goods, services, and WTO 
rules can be found in the following WTO documents: 
"Goods Schedule" [W T/AC C /KH M /21/Add.l], "Service
Schedule" [W T/AC C/KHM /21/Add.2], and "Working 
Party Report" [W T/ACC/KHM/21).
restrictions having equivalent effects that could not 
be justified under the provisions of the WTO 
agreements.
In terms of market access in services, foreign 
involvement was generally permitted except in a 
very limited number of areas where local initiatives 
might be threatened.4 Liberalization in services 
focused on areas that would contribute most to 
the investment climate. For example, Cambodia 
committed itself to allow foreign firms to operate 
in the areas of legal services, accounting, auditing, 
bookkeeping, banking, management consulting, 
telecommunications, and transport. To help 
Cambodians develop the skills needed for a 
modern, competitive economy, the country allowed 
foreign firms to provide higher education and adult 
education services. In addition, Cambodia liberalized 
services in the areas of health care and sanitation, 
refuse, and sewerage services, with the expectation 
that a foreign presence in these activities can con­
tribute to improvements in public health. Cambodia 
also took on commitments to liberalize in sectors 
where it had long had an open policy regarding 
foreign participation, such as in banking, tourism, 
transport, and courier services, and where 
Cambodians could compete successfully with 
foreigners, such as in guide services.
In terms of subsidies, Cambodia agreed to comply 
with the Subsidies Agreement from the Protocol of 
Accession. It would either eliminate the existing 
system of remission of import fees and waiver of 
duty for certain goods used by certain investors 
[mostly export-oriented] or establish a functioning 
duty drawback system consistent with WTO provi­
sions, through amendment of the Law on Invest­
ment, as necessary, by the end of 2013. Cambodia 
was, however, able to retain the right to waive 
customs duties on imported inputs used by its 
export industries. Securing exporters' access to 
imported inputs at world prices was extremely 
important for the garment industry and was thus 
an important negotiating objective for Cambodia.
Cambodia made a commitment to bind export 
subsidies in agriculture at zero and not to apply
4 For example, Cambodia committed to open its hotel 
market only for hotels o f three stars and higher and 
committed to allow foreign supply o f retailing services 
only for a small number o f specific items or for 
supermarkets or large department stores [with floor 
space no smaller than 2,000 square meters).
such subsidies in the future. It is, however, impor­
tant to note that under the WTO Agreement on 
Agriculture, LDCs are not required to do so. 
According to the Cambodian government, agricul­
tural export subsidies were given up because they 
are neither desirable nor fiscally feasible in this 
country. Cambodia did maintain the right to pro­
vide export subsidies for industrial goods.
In the light of Cambodia's LDC status, the acces­
sion agreement allowed for a phased implementa­
tion of the main WTO agreements. Cambodia was 
granted four transition periods, delaying imple­
mentation of TRIPS [excluding pharmaceuticals and 
agricultural chemicals) until January I, 2007; the 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) 
(product standards and technical regulations 
ensuring the safety of products) until January I, 
2007; the Agreement on Sanitary and Phyto- 
sanitary Measures (SPS) (measures to protect the 
health of people, plants, and animals) until January 
I, 2008; and the Agreement on Customs Valuation 
until January 1, 2009.
The Stakeholders
Cambodia
Cambodia lost its quota-based preferential access to 
foreign textile and clothing markets, especially the 
U.S. and EU markets, because of the phasing out of 
the ATC at the end of 2004. Losing garment 
export markets could be disastrous for Cambodia 
given the fact that the industry supported more 
than 230,000 workers and accounted for more 
than 80 percent of total exports (Table 1). Indeed, 
Cambodia's primary goal in acceding to the WTO 
was to protect its garment industry. WTO mem­
bership was expected to provide market access to 
existing and emerging markets through a lower 
tariff rate, which could be as low as zero for an 
LDC like Cambodia, without any ceiling on quanti­
ties that could be exported. For Cambodia, how­
ever, entering the WTO did not necessarily mean 
expanded market access because it would still face 
potential competition from highly competitive sup­
pliers like China and India. The combined effect of 
WTO accession and textile and clothing sector 
liberalization is difficult to predict, and the exact 
outcome will depend largely on the competitiveness 
of Cambodia's garment sector relative to that of 
other countries.
Table 1: Cambodia's G arm ent Industry
Year Export Value (million US$)
Share of Total 
Exports (%)
Employment
(thousands) Number of Factories
1995 27 3.3 18 20
1996 80 12.1 24 24
1997 227 28.9 82 67
1998 359 51.7 79 129
1999 661 66.2 96 152
2000 985 77.0 161 190
2001 1,156 81.4 187 185
2002 1,338 81.3 208 187
2003 1,607 83.8 234 197
Source: Bargawi 200S .
In a broader context, upon WTO accession, 
Cambodia could benefit from the rights accorded 
to all members under the WTO agreements, such 
as most-favored-nation [MFN] treatment, access to 
the WTO dispute settlement procedure, and par­
ticipation in multilateral trade rule making and 
standard setting.5 Acceding to a rule-based and 
predictable multilateral trading system such as the 
WTO could in turn engender more transparency 
and predictability in Cambodia's domestic policies 
and regulations. For countries like Cambodia that 
have suffered from a long history of political insta­
bility, this aspect is particularly important. Predicta­
ble and stable domestic policies could help attract 
more foreign direct investment and boost eco­
nomic development.
It is worth noting that in addition to the benefits 
available to all member countries, Cambodia also 
enjoyed the SDT designed for developing countries. 
SDT typically includes four major areas: privileged 
access to the markets of trading partners, particu­
larly the developed countries; the right to restrict 
imports to a greater degree than developed coun­
tries; freedom to subsidize exports; and flexibility 
in applying certain WTO rules or the right to 
postpone applying rules. For Cambodia, the transi­
tion periods permitted for implementation of vari­
ous WTO agreements partly reflected the 
provisions of SDT.
Other Acceding LDCs
The United Nations' list of LDCs currently contains 
50 countries, of which 32 have become WTO 
members to date. Since the establishment of the 
WTO in 1995, only 2 out of 21 countries that have 
acceded are LDCs—Cambodia and Nepal. Currently 
about 30 countries are in the process of accession, 
of which 8 are LDCs, whereas most of the others 
are low-income developing countries [Table 2], The 
remaining 10 LDCs have not yet submitted their 
accession requests to the organization. For those 
currently seeking WTO membership, Cambodia has 
set a good example from which numerous lessons 
can be learned.
5 Whether an LDC like Cambodia can actually enjoy these 
rights is questionable. Murphy [2007] points out that 
LDCs generally have difficulty participating in WTO 
negotiations either because they lack representation in 
Geneva or have limited staff available to work on WTO 
issues domestically.
First, like Cambodia, all LDCs currently seeking 
WTO membership are small economies that have 
no current or potential capability to become major 
players in the world market or power to disrupt 
other WTO members' domestic markets. This fact 
could be a bargaining factor used to facilitate and 
expedite their accession negotiations [Siphana
2005],
Second, Cambodia's unilateral tariff cuts and legisla­
tive and institutional improvements before acces­
sion have been key to its successful accession. 
Acceding LDCs, especially those whose domestic 
and trade policies are not in accordance with WTO 
rules, should implement substantive reforms in 
their domestic laws and regulations to align them 
with WTO disciplines before they apply to the 
WTO. This task may pose difficulties for the LDCs 
because they often lack institutional, financial, and 
human resources. In this case, a strong domestic 
political commitment to accession and sometimes 
external financial and technical assistance become 
necessary. For example, Cambodia's strong political 
will has secured domestic executive and legislative 
support during the whole accession period. Mean­
while Cambodia made active use of technical assis­
tance and consultancies from international organi­
zations, in particular through the Integrated 
Framework for Trade-Related Technical Assistance 
for Least Developed Countries [IF].6
Third, Cambodia's experiences show that the acces­
sion process can be extremely complex and time 
consuming. In fact, among the countries currently 
seeking membership, some applications date back 
to the late 1980s [Algeria] or early 1990s [Belarus, 
Russia, Sudan, and Ukraine] [Table 2], Therefore, 
applicants should form realistic expectations of 
what the WTO accession process involves. They 
should expect the process to take at least 5 to 10 
years, or even longer. Given ministerial and staff 
turnover, a long-term, broad base of government,
6 The IF is a multiagency, multidonor program that helps 
the least-developed countries expand their participation 
in the global economy, thereby enhancing their eco­
nomic growth and poverty reduction strategies. The IF 
program was first mandated by the WTO Singapore 
Ministerial Conference in December 1996. The partici­
pating agencies are the International Monetary Fund 
[IMF], the International Trade Centre [ITC], the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
[UNCTAD], the United Nations Development Pro­
gramme [UNDP], the World Bank, and the WTO.
civil society, and private sector support for the 
accession initiative is required.
WTO and Existing Members
The inclusion of another LDC, Cambodia, as a 
member is a major step forward in making the 
WTO a truly global organization. With further 
expansion of the WTO, international trade will be 
increasingly subject to universally-applied, multi­
lateral rules rather than non-transparent, unilateral 
policies that have been directed against exports for 
decades. This change could be expected to push 
more WTO members toward realizing that interna­
tionally agreed rules now set effective limits to the 
conduct of national trade policies [Langhammer and
Lucke 1999], For the WTO, Cambodia's accession, 
along with Nepal's, was also proof that the organi­
zation is able to accommodate the trading needs of 
world's poorest nations.
From the standpoint of current LDC members, 
Cambodia's accession represents a potential 
improvement in the balancing of political power 
among competing interests. In the WTO, decisions 
are made, prima facie, by negotiations and consen­
sus and not by economic power or trade share. 
Legally, all members have equal rights of 
participation and the same level of influence on the 
outcome of negotiations irrespective of their levels 
of economic development. Therefore, although
Table 2 : L is t o f  C ountries C u rre n tly  Seeking Accession to  the W TO
Europe and 
Central Asia
Middle East 
and North 
Africa
East Asia and 
Pacific Sub-Saharan Africa South Asia
Latin America 
and Caribbean
Russia 
[June 1993]
Algeria 
(June 1987]
Viet Nam 
(Jan. 1995]
Sudan* 
(Oct. 1994]
Bhutan* 
(Sept. 1999]
Bahamas 
(May 2001]
Belarus 
[Sept. 1993]
Lebanon 
(Jan. 1999]
Tonga”  
(June 1995]
Seychelles 
(May 1995]
Afghanistan* 
(Dec. 2004]
Ukraine 
[Nov. 1993]
Yemen* 
(April 2000]
Vanuatu* 
[July 1995]
Cape Verde* 
[Nov. 1999]
Uzbekistan 
[Dec. 1994]
Libya
(June 2004]
Lao PDR* 
[July 1997]
Ethiopia* 
(Jan. 2003]
Kazakhstan 
[Jan. 1996]
Iraq
(Dec. 2004]
Samoa* 
(April 1998]
Sao Tome and Principe* 
(May 2005]
Azerbaijian 
[June 1997]
Iran
(May 2005]
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
[May 1999]
Andorra 
[July 1999]
Tajikistan 
[May 2001]
Serbia
[Feb. 2005]
Montenegro 
[Feb. 2005]
Note: Dates in parentheses show when the accession process was initiated.
* denotes least-developed country.
** Tonga's accession agreement was approved on December IS, 200S, and is now subject to parliamentary ratification. 
Source: WTO 2006a.
Cambodia is not expected to be a key player in 
economic terms, its membership is widely 
welcomed by the incumbent member countries, 
especially the LDCs, who can count on Cambodia 
to take up the issues confronting them. Given its 
shared objectives with other LDCs, Cambodia's 
entry might affect the future negotiation process in 
the WTO in favor of the LDCs. With Cambodia's 
accession to the WTO, the use of the consensus- 
based Dispute Settlement Mechanism [DSM] might 
be expected to enhance resolution of international 
trade disputes in ways more favorable to LDCs.
Apart from these institutional effects, the accession 
of an applicant to the WTO might have some 
economic consequences on other WTO members 
as multilateral trade liberalization enhances import 
and export opportunities and thus affects the 
welfare of current members. High-income WTO 
members will probably benefit from terms of trade 
improvements as the global supply of their import 
goods increases by more than the global supply of 
their export goods; some developing-country 
WTO members whose exports compete directly 
with applicant-country exports may suffer from 
corresponding terms of trade deterioration. But 
compared with recently acceding large developing 
countries such as China, the expected terms of 
trade effects from Cambodia's accession [and that 
of other LDCs] may be insignificant.
Policy Issues and Questions
Accession Issues
As indicated in Article XII of the Marrakech 
Agreement, "decisions on accession of new mem­
bers shall be taken by the Ministerial Conference. 
The Ministerial Conference shall approve the 
agreement on the terms of accession by a two- 
thirds majority of the Members of the WTO." 
Article XII does not stipulate any membership 
criteria, however, and gives no guidance on the 
"terms to be agreed," leaving them to the negotia­
tions between the WTO members and the candi­
date. The brevity of this text seems to suggest that 
entering the WTO is an easy and expedited 
process. Unfortunately, recent experience has 
shown the opposite: WTO accession can be cum­
bersome and extremely time consuming. For China, 
the process took more than 15 years. The average 
length of the accession process for the three
newest members—Nepal, Cambodia, and Saudi 
Arabia—was around 10 years [Figure 1],
The slow pace of accession is only partly due to a 
lack of preparedness on the part of applicants. It 
also results from the complicated procedure an 
applicant country must follow during its accession 
process. At least 20 distinct steps can be readily 
identified [WTO 2004], The most important steps 
are the creation of a Working Party to consider 
the application for WTO membership, the drafting 
of a memorandum on the applicant's foreign trade 
regime, the applicant's satisfactory answering of 
questions from existing WTO members about this 
memorandum, bilateral negotiations with each of 
the Working Party members and multilateral 
negotiations with respect to WTO rules, the 
adoption of the Protocol of Accession by the 
Working Party and then by the WTO's General 
Council or Ministerial Conference, and finally the 
ratification of the protocol by the acceding 
country's parliament.
It is, however, the terms, rather than the multi-step 
procedures, that have really caused the protracted 
accession process for recently acceding countries. 
Broadly speaking, the terms to be negotiated deal 
with two types of issues: [1] commitments on WTO 
rules and [2] commitments and concessions directly 
relating to market access for goods and services. 
The WTO agreement and its annexes contain 
mandatory rules on the conduct of a wide range of 
national trade-related policies. Compared with 
GATT 1947, the rules are far more detailed and 
cover a wider range of topics, such as international 
trade in services [GATS], intellectual property 
rights [TRIPS], technical barriers to trade [TBT], and 
sanitary and phytosanitary barriers to trade [SPS], 
Accession negotiations therefore involve a detailed 
review of the relevant legislation and practice of 
applicant countries. Current members typically take 
the view that these practices must be substantially 
in line with WTO rules by the time an applicant 
joins the WTO [WTO 2004], In recent accessions, 
the implementation of particular legislation was 
deferred until after accession only in very few 
cases, with the exact timing specified in the 
acceding country's Protocol of Accession (WTO 
2004], The existing financial, technical, 
institutional, and regulatory gap restraining 
acceding countries from implementing policies in 
conformity with the rule can therefore hinder their 
accession process.
Figure 1: Length o f Accession to  the W TO  fo r Recent Mem bers
Country
Source: WTO 2004
Second, accession negotiations deal with market 
access for imported goods and services in applicant 
countries. Among GATT 1947 and WTO members, 
the protection offered to domestic firms has been 
progressively reduced as a result of successive 
rounds of trade negotiations; nevertheless, the level 
of protection still differs widely among WTO 
members [Langhammer and Lucke 1999]. Relevant 
policy instruments include the level and dispersion 
of import tariffs for goods and market access 
commitments in services. Accession negotiations 
have become protracted because some current 
WTO members are using their leverage in negotia­
tions to extract concessions from acceding coun­
tries that go much further than the commitments 
made by current WTO members at a similar level 
of economic development. Acceding countries are 
forced into negotiating bilateral terms with all key 
trading partners, and in most cases these negotia­
tions involve numerous rounds of intensive 
bargaining.
WTO+ and WTO-
According to official notes for WTO accession 
[WTO 2004], when seeking WTO membership, a 
country not only must abide by all WTO rules, but 
may also be required to make further commitments
and concessions that individual members are 
allowed to ask for [during bilateral negotiations] in 
return for supporting the application. Without the 
support of key WTO members, there is no chance 
that the applications would be accepted. A contro­
versy then arises concerning whether these addi­
tional commitments go beyond the ones agreed to 
by the incumbent countries [constituting WTO+ 
commitments] or require an accession country to 
forgo the rights available to other WTO members 
[WTO- rights],
Cambodia's accession provides a good example of 
both WTO+ and WTO- at work. For example, the 
30 percent average bound tariff rate for agricul­
tural commodities in Cambodia is significantly 
lower than that in other LDC members. For exam­
ple, Bangladesh, a GATT contracting party and one 
of the 32 LDC WTO members, has an average 
bound tariff rate of 200 percent [ERS, USDA
2006], In terms of peak tariffs, Cambodia—a coun­
try where the majority of the population is 
employed in the agricultural sector—has been 
asked to provide less protection to its sensitive 
agricultural sectors than Canada, the EU, and the 
United States. The peak tariff for agricultural 
commodities in Cambodia was set at 60 percent,
compared with 120 percent in Canada, 252 percent 
in the EU, and 121 percent in the United States. For 
sensitive products such as rice, a tariff bound of 40 
percent was established. Such a low bound tariff 
rate could limit Cambodia's ability to protect 
against import surges in its most important 
agricultural commodity.7
An example of W TO- for Cambodia was that it 
was required to introduce data protection for 
pharmaceuticals immediately after its accession to 
the WTO, which is before both its 2007 accession 
requirement to comply with TRIPS and the new 
compliance deadline for pharmaceutical patenting 
agreed to in the Doha agenda for LDCs (that is, 
20I6).8 This W TO- requirement will prevent 
Cambodia's regulatory authority from using test 
data to assess bio-equivalent generic drugs and will 
thereby slow down the production or import of 
generic versions of the medicines. By preventing 
generic competition with the protected drugs 
(patented or non-patented], this obligation could 
have serious negative implications for public health 
in Cambodia.
In addition, Cambodia agreed to eliminate agri­
cultural export subsidies by binding them at zero, 
although under the Agreement on Agriculture 
(AoA] LDCs were not required to undertake any 
commitments on export subsidies. This provision 
effectively seals off Cambodia's right under the 
AoA to introduce export subsidies on any agricul­
tural product in the future should this be necessary 
in order to protect the livelihoods of poor farmers 
or to achieve development priorities.
7 Cambodia may rely on certain "safeguard" provisions 
to protect against sudden import surges that may cause 
substantial disturbances to domestic markets. The use of 
such measures, however, can lead to a nontransparent 
form of protection that introduces unpredictability and 
instability and hence is regulated by the WTO though 
the Agreement on Anti-dumping, the Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, and the Agree- 
ment on Safeguards.
8 The TRIPS itself represents a W TO - for Cambodia. In 
the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS agreement and public 
health, all LDCs have the right to delay the imple- 
mentation of sections 5 and 7 of Part 11 of the TRIPS 
agreement in relation to pharmaceutical patents until 
2016 [WT/ MIN[01]/ DEC/2]. The draft report of the 
Working Party shows that Cambodia had asked for a 
2009 deadline for TRIPS compliance, including pharma­
ceuticals, but they were eventually bargained down to 
January 1, 2007.
Given all the WTO+ and W TO- commitments 
facing Cambodia, it is not surprising that upon the 
adoption of Cambodia's accession package on July 
22, 2003, Mr. Cham Prasidh, minister of commerce 
and chief negotiator for Cambodia, commented: 
"This is a package of concessions and commitments 
that goes far beyond what is commensurate with 
the level of development of an LDC like Cambodia" 
(Charveriat and Kirkbride 2003 p.l].
Similar WTO+ and W TO- commitments also 
occurred to other recently acceding countries. For 
example, China had to agree to very substantial 
tariff reductions, most notably on agriculture, 
which went far beyond obligations of existing 
WTO members. It also had to agree to a special 
safeguard clause allowing individual WTO members 
to take measures to limit imports of Chinese 
products in case of a surge. This extraordinary 
measure, which goes against the founding principle 
of the WTO, the MFN clause, will apply to China 
for 12 years after accession. WTO+ and W TO- 
commitments differentiate WTO members, and 
they could be interpreted as contributing to a 
multi-tier multilateral trade system. This systemic 
concern is in addition to any of the adverse 
developmental effects that may result from these 
specific commitments.
Special and Differential Treatment (SDT)
Ensuring that the multilateral trade system pro­
motes development remains a fundamental chal­
lenge confronting the WTO. Traditionally, devel­
oping countries have sought differential and more 
favorable treatment in the GATT/WTO with a 
view to increasing the development relevance. Such 
special and differential treatment [SDT] was made an 
element of the trading system in 1979 through the 
so-called "Enabling Clause" negotiated during the 
Tokyo Round (Keck and Low 2004], Currently 
there are 97 SDT provisions in the Uruguay Round 
agreements that fall into four major categories 
(discussed earlier in the section "Major Commit­
ments"]. In addition, technical assistance to help 
LDCs implement the commitments is suggested. 
Further special provisions in favor of particularly 
poor LDCs exist.
Many developing countries enjoy preferential 
access to markets in developed countries. The first 
preferential scheme put in place by a number of 
countries was the Generalized System of
Preferences [GSP], for which a permanent waiver 
from the nondiscrimination requirement was 
eventually obtained under the Enabling Clause. 
Other schemes limited to a defined subset of 
beneficiaries include, for example, the African 
Growth and Opportunity Act [AGOA] and the 
Caribbean Basin Initiative of the United States, and 
the EU's "Everything But Arms" [EBA] initiative for 
least-developed countries. Regional preferential 
trading arrangements among developing countries 
are permissible even when they do not meet the 
requirements of Article XXIV of GATT 1994 
[Langhammer and Lurcke 1999],
The WTO agreements also acknowledge that 
developing countries may find it particularly diffi­
cult to fully meet WTO obligations with respect to 
trade liberalization. Developing countries are there­
fore allowed greater freedom to restrict trade in 
exceptional situations [such as in the presence of 
balance of payments problems [Article XII of 
GATT 1994]] and to withdraw from existing com­
mitments such as tariff bindings in order to protect 
infant industries [Article XVIII of GATT 1994]. 
Developing countries are also allowed to provide 
more domestic support to agriculture and are sub­
ject to lower tariff and subsidy reduction commit­
ments.9 Other special provisions for developing 
countries relate to extended implementation 
periods for various WTO rules (such as Article 15 
of the Agreement on Agriculture, Article 10 of the 
SPS, Article 12 of the TBT, and Article 27 of the 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measurements [SCM]].
The most prominent features of the SDT associated 
with Cambodia's accession are the longer imple­
mentation periods for TBT [2007], SPS [2008], 
Customs Valuation [2009], and TRIPS [2007], 
However, this SDT package has very limited implica­
tions for Cambodia because within this short 
implementation period this poor country can 
hardly make any realistic adjustments. In contrast, 
existing LDC members have until 2016 to imple­
ment TRIPS, for instance.
Furthermore, implementing all these agreements 
within few years of accession will be extremely
9 The de m inim is permissible subsidies in developing 
countries are 10 percent of the value of production, 
instead of the normal 5 percent for developed countries. 
The average tariff reduction commitments for developing 
countries are 24 percent compared with 36 percent for 
developed countries.
burdensome for a country like Cambodia, where 
the national budget is under stress (the deficit was 
5 percent of GDP in 2003] and already unable to 
cover essential social expenditures in health and 
education. According to available estimates, the 
cost of implementing such agreements is around 
US$100 million (Charveriat and Kirkbride 2003], in 
addition to the other costs associated with post­
accession adjustments. Yet the Working Party 
rejected the Cambodian negotiators' demand for 
technical assistance in implementing the four 
agreements.
Policy Options
Although there is much debate about how the 
Doha Development Round should proceed, there is 
no question that accession issues are on the 
negotiation agenda. The experiences of Cambodia 
and Nepal illustrate what WTO accession might 
entail for an LDC. From these cases, one might 
conclude that the WTO accession process is 
inherently power based and the very antithesis of 
the original intention and design of the WTO. 
Indeed, the acceding countries have not received 
what is best for their trade and development 
interests, but only what they can negotiate with 
existing members. The most challenging aspect, 
however, is that it is very difficult to change the 
current WTO accession practice because acceding 
countries have no role to play in setting the rules 
relating to accession since they are by definition 
outside the system. And once they are inside the 
system, they either lose the incentives or simply do 
not have the power to make a change. This 
situation serves the interests of powerful WTO 
members and undermines the credibility of the 
WTO as a rules-based system.
Attempts within the WTO to change this situation 
and to facilitate LDCs' accession were well reflected 
in its legal documents. Paragraph 9 of the Doha 
Ministerial Declaration, signed by 142 member 
countries of the WTO at Doha, Qatar, in Novem­
ber 2001, commits "to accelerating the accession of 
LDCs" (WTO 2001], In paragraph 42 members 
pledged that "Accession of LDCs remains a priority 
for the Membership. We agree to work to facilitate 
and accelerate negotiations with acceding LDCs." 
Furthermore, the General Council decided on 
December 10, 2002, to streamline the process of 
LDCs' accession (WTO 2002], The Cancun
Ministerial Conference again stated, "We take the 
opportunity to reaffirm our commitment to the 
Guidelines on the Accession of LDCs adopted by 
the General Council on 10 December 2002, and to 
facilitate and accelerate their accession" [WTO 
2003b). Despite these statements, however, there is 
no evidence that they have helped facilitate the 
fast-track accession of LDCs to the WTO in 
recently acceding cases.
If the developed-country members of the WTO 
really want to accelerate and simplify the accession 
process of the LDCs and push the WTO in a pro- 
development direction, they must go beyond the 
rhetoric and pursue several concrete steps. First, 
Article XII of the Agreement Establishing the 
WTO should be interpreted with clear-cut guide­
lines detailing transparent criteria for accession. The 
WTO should incorporate a specific provision for 
the accession of LDCs relative to other acceding 
developing countries. In the accession process, 
efforts should be made to expedite document 
exchange and streamline accession procedures with 
assistance from the Secretariat. WTO members and 
the Working Party should adopt additional meas­
ures in their bilateral negotiations to facilitate and 
streamline the accession process.10
Second, in terms of market access, members should 
exercise restraint in seeking concessions and com­
mitments on goods and services from acceding 
LDCs and take into account those undertaken by 
existing LDC members. Acceding LDCs could be 
asked to make commitments commensurate with 
their level of economic development, administrative 
and institutional capacity, and trade and financial 
needs, but should not be required to undertake 
higher levels of commitments than those made by 
the founding LDC member countries of the WTO.1
10 In consultation with members, the Secretariat has 
streamlined the accession process for least-developed and 
small island developing economies by reducing the 
number of Working Party meetings [to an average of 
three or four) and by ensuring that maximum progress is 
made between meetings without requiring the acceding 
government to visit Geneva. To the extent possible, 
bilateral market access negotiations in goods and services 
are held in the capital of the acceding government [WTO 
2004).
1 While there is some consensus among members on
restraining their demands for concessions, there is much 
less agreement on establishing equal treatment between 
applicants and existing members.
Moreover, acceding LDCs should not be asked to 
make commitment on any of the plurilateral 
agreements of the WTO or to participate in other 
optional sectoral market access initiatives.
Third, the SDT as set out in WTO legal documents 
might be made equally applicable to all acceding 
LDCs from the date of their accession. Different 
transitional arrangements under specific WTO 
agreements could be granted, taking into account 
individual development, financial, and trade needs. 
In addition, all SDT should be made mandatory and 
legally binding and subject to the dispute settle­
ment system of the WTO.12
Fourth, acceding LDCs should get high priority for 
receiving targeted and coordinated technical assis­
tance and capacity building covering all stages of 
the accession process. The role of the IF could be 
emphasized so that effective collaboration between 
WTO and other organizations and donors could be 
achieved. In the case of Cambodia and Nepal, the IF 
contributed positively to the accession process. 
Ethiopia, Lao PDR, and Yemen are among the 31 
LDCs currently in various stages of the IF process.
Finally, given the importance of the agricultural 
sector in the economies of LDCs—particularly its 
role in poverty reduction, human development, 
food security, and rural development—commit­
ments on subsidies and tariffs on agricultural com­
modities should be negotiated with great care.
Assignment
Taking into account the interests of the identified 
stakeholder groups, your assignment is to recom­
mend how the accession process can be streamlined 
for least-developed countries.
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12 The work of the Trade and Development Committee 
on SDT provisions is still underway [WTO 2006b). The 
Doha Declaration has mandated the committee to identify 
which of those SDT provisions are mandatory and to 
consider the legal and practical implications of making 
mandatory those that are currently nonbinding.
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